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Abstract: Nowadays global value chains (GVCs) play a central role in trade flows. This paper argues that GVCs can play an 
important role in transmission of national trade policy effects across borders. More specifically, this study examines how domestic 
export incentives can affect foreign countries` exporters in the presence of GVCs. Existing theoretical literature suggests that in 
addition to negative “competition for market share” effects, there can be positive effects, which propagate via backward and 
forward GVCs linkages. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that empirically tests these effects. In particular, 
using recent trade data for BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) this study shows that in the GVCs world there can be 
both negative and positive effects of domestic export incentives for foreign exporters as theory predicts. According to our 
framework, positive effects propagate via GVCs linkages.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The production of most goods is increasingly organized along global value chains (GVCs), in which different 
stages of the production process are fragmented across countries. This worldwide phenomenon has attracted 
a lot of attention among policy makers, business leaders, trade economists and academic researchers alike. 
Consequently, a large academic literature has emerged to investigate how the possibility to fragment 
production processes across borders may affect the volume, pattern and consequences of international trade 
(see, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1996; Yi 2003; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). However, GVCs are 
undeservingly rarely considered in theoretical and empirical analysis of trade policy (for relevant discussion 
see also Blanchard, Bown and Johnson 2016) though the question how should trade policy be designed in the 
presence of global production networks is considered to be of first-order importance (Manova 2015). In this 
paper, we take a step toward filling these voids by exploring effects of domestic export incentives on foreign 
countries` export in the presence of GVCs linkages.    
 The main issue in both policy and academic discussion of export incentives and particularly export 
subsidies is whether they have significant negative impacts on foreign (rival) countries. Earlier strategic trade 
policy literature (Spencer and Brander 1983; Brander and Spenser 1985; To 1994) conclude that in the world 
of imperfect competition and without trade in intermediates (i.e. without GVCs), export subsidies can help 
domestic firms to capture market shares of foreign firms in international markets thereby pointing to negative 
effects of domestic export incentives on foreign export. In this study we refer to such effects as to negative 
“competition for market share” effects.  
However, as Hoekman (2015) notes, once the shift towards GVCs production is considered and 
linkages within and across value chains must be taken into account, determining the net effects of 
government export policies becomes more complicated. In particular, domestic sectoral or firm-specific 
government policies in GVCs world can benefit GVC as a whole including foreign firms/plants, their 
workers and local communities. This further raises concerns about the power of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and their ability to lobby certain policy measures whether in their base country or in foreign 
countries, which would benefit their activities worldwide via GVCs.    
Several theoretical papers (Spencer and Jones 1991; Bernhofen 1997; Ishikawa and Spencer 1998; 
Sheldon, Pick, and McCorriston 2001; Lee and Wong 2005) attempted to shed light on this issue by studying 
external export incentives` effects in the presence of trade in intermediates (main attribute of GVCs). In 
general, these studies conclude that under certain theoretical assumptions and in the presence of trade in 
intermediates, domestic export incentives, particularly export subsidies, can lead to profit/rent-shifting to 
foreign producers-exporters within common value chains. In this paper, based on the mentioned theoretical 
studies, we distinguish between two main types of such effects. First one, we name it positive forward 
linkages` effect, emerges as a result of domestic export incentive for intermediate-good producers. This 
incentive leads to the cost reduction of produced abroad exportable final/higher-tier intermediate goods, 
which uses subsidized imported intermediate good in its production. Second one, we name it positive 
backward linkages` effect, emerges as a result of domestic export incentive for final-good/processed 
intermediate-good producers. In particular, this incentive stimulates demand increase for imported foreign 
intermediate goods, which are used in production of subsidized domestic final/higher-tier processed 
intermediate good.  
We provide empirical test of the presence of the outlined effects in the BRICs1 bloc`s trade in recent 
years (2009-2015). BRIC countries are very suitable for this project, first and utmost, due to their rather 
aggressive export promotion policies in recent years, which in fact should harm significantly commercial 
interests of each other. In particular, Evenett (2015) reports that BRICS (Evenett also includes South Africa 
into his analysis) countries`  commercial interests have been hit over 2700 times by trade policy measures of 
other countries since the Global Crisis began and almost a third of the times a BRICS commercial interest is 
harmed, it is due to actions taken by another member of the club. He suggests that “a straightforward way for 
                                                          
1 The ‘BRIC’ is an acronym for the four largest and most dynamic emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India and China. The four 
countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) held their first summit in 2009. At the end of 2010, South Africa was officially 
invited to join the group (henceforth called ‘BRICS’) and attended the third summit in 2011. I do not include South Africa in  the 
analysis because its share in the BRICS export is very small – only 3% of the BRICS` cumulative export in 2010-2014 according 
to the data of International Trade Centre of WTO and UN (http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Product_SelCountry_TS.aspx).     
the BRICS to show greater solidarity would be to initiate a programme to unwind the 1196 measures that 
they have taken that harm each other’s commercial interests”. Evenett (2015) further reports that since the 
Global Crisis began three of the BRICS (Brazil, India, and China) have implemented additional incentives to 
inflate exports. These incentives harm the interests of trading partners that compete in the same markets 
abroad, including BRICS members itself. In this paper, we suggest that due to rather high interdependence of 
BRIC countries via GVCs linkages there can be also significant positive effects of export incentives 
implemented in one BRIC country for the export of other three BRIC countries. Indeed, according to our 
analysis of relevant data, BRIC countries demonstrate growing GVCs linkages between each other in recent 
years.  
In our empirical analysis, we specifically study how export incentives implemented in one BRIC 
country affect exports of the other three BRIC countries via GVCs linkages in period 2009-2015. To 
accomplish this, in gravity equations for export by industry estimated for each BRIC country, we control for 
export incentives implemented in each of the other three BRIC countries in respective industries. We further 
construct specific weights for these “foreign” export incentives which reflect backward/forward GVCs 
linkages between respective two BRIC countries for respective industries using bilateral data on origin of 
value added in gross exports (by exporting and source country-industry) published by OECD-TiVA. Due to 
high aggregation of the weights (two-digit and broader ISIC revision 3 sectors), the resultant indicators of 
weighted foreign export incentives can exhibit both positive and negative relationship with export of the 
examined country. Positive relationship would indicate the dominance of positive effects transmitting via 
GVCs linkages for a respective BRICs country-pair while negative relationship would point to the 
dominance of classical negative “competition for market share” effects of foreign export incentives.  
Our empirical analysis provides rather convincing evidence that external effects of export incentives 
can be positive which confirms that GVCs can play important role in transmission of trade policy effects 
across borders. First, we find that Indian export incentives implemented for intermediate goods mostly 
positively affect export of Brazil and China due to GVCs` forward linkages. These results mean that when 
India implements export incentives for intermediates, which are intensively used in exportable production in 
Brazil and China, positive effects emerge for competitiveness of respective Brazilian and Chinese export 
products in the world market via, e.g., cost reduction as theory suggests. Furthermore, these positive effects 
seem to outweigh possible negative “competition for market share” effects.   
Second, strongest positive effects via GVCs backward linkages are coming from Russian export 
incentives implemented for final and processed intermediate goods for Brazilian and Chinese export to 
Russia and from Brazilian export incentives to Indian export to Brazil. These results suggest that when 
Russia/Brazil implement export incentives for processed intermediates or final goods, Brazil and China/India 
increase their export of inputs to Russia/Brazil, which are used in Russian/Brazilian exportable production of 
exposed goods.  
However, we should stress that overall our findings show that negative effects still seem to dominate. 
This enables us to conclude that GVCs linkages between BRICs are not strong enough to significantly 
dampen negative “competition for market shares” effects coming from each other’s export incentives. 
Russian export seems to suffer most from negative effects of export incentives implemented in the other 
three BRICs. On the one hand, this can be due to weak GVCs linkages between Russia and other three 
BRICs, and, on the other hand, due to rather strong negative “competition for market share” effects coming 
to Russia from export incentives implemented in the other three BRIC countries.  
First and utmost, this paper contributes to a strand of theoretical literature that found profit/rent-
shifting effects from domestic export incentives to foreign producers in the presence of trade in intermediates 
(Spencer and Jones 1991; Bernhofen 1997; Ishikawa and Spencer 1998; Sheldon, Pick, and McCorriston 
2001; Lee and Wong 2005). Despite the prominence of this theory, to the best of our knowledge there is no 
single study, which would empirically examine these effects. In this paper, we take a step toward bridging 
this gap between theory and evidence.  
This study further relates to recently emerging literature on trade policies in the age of global value 
chains (Balwin and Venables 2013; Gawande, Hoekman, Cui 2015; Blanchard, Bown and Johnson 2016). 
Finally, though in recent years BRIC countries have become salient players in the world trade, only few trade 
research papers (see, e.g., Cakir and Kabundi (2013) and Iapadre and Tajoli (2014)) have attempted to 
analyze the BRICs in terms of their trade patterns, developing integration, and potential bloc-wide 
cohesiveness. This study attempts to enrich this scant literature.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical background of the study. Section 3 
introduces our empirical case, in particular, it discusses recent data on BRICs export incentives and BRICs 
current involvement in GVCs including their interdependence via GVCs. Section 4 describes empirical 
strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses empirical results. Finally, section 6 offers conclusions.    
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Though the perfectly competitive model of international trade says that, in general, export subsidies reduce 
home country welfare, in the world of imperfect competition by subsidizing/promoting export countries 
might increase their domestic welfare if they win in competition for profitable international markets. In their 
seminal paper Spencer and Brander (1983) has shown that in imperfectly competitive international markets, a 
government, which has the objective of maximizing domestic welfare, may have an incentive to subsidize 
research and development activities of domestic firms in industries in which they compete with foreign firms 
for international markets. In particular, they conclude that in the case of subsidy domestic welfare is 
improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent-earning industries, although the subsidy-
ridden non-cooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. In a companion paper Brander and 
Spencer (1985) further present the analysis based on imperfect competition (in particular, they incorporate 
Cournot duopoly into a one-period “third market” model) to explain why export subsidies might be attractive 
policies from a domestic point of view. They found that governments` optimal policy is to subsidize exports 
because export subsidy improves the relative position of the domestic firm in non-cooperative rivalries with 
other firms, and allow it to expand its market share. To (1994) goes forward and examines export policy 
using a two-period model of oligopolistic competition with switching costs. He concludes: “When 
governments and firms are patient, consumers are impatient, and switching costs are significant, exporting 
countries will subsidize exports in the first period. A subsidy helps capture market share which is valuable to 
the government in terms of both second-period profits and second-period tax revenues” (To 1994, p. 100). 
All these studies come to a general conclusion that in markets with imperfect competition export incentives 
(subsidies, in particular) can benefit implemented countries and harm affected (rival) foreign countries if they 
help subsidized domestic firms to capture market shares of foreign firms in international markets. In other 
words domestic export promotion measures enhance domestic export (lead to the increase of domestic export 
shares in the world markets in affected industries) but negatively affect export of foreign rivals (i.e. the 
respective export shares of affected foreign countries fall). In the rest of the paper, we refer to the latter effect 
(i.e. negative effect of export incentive targeted at domestic good for foreign export of the same good) as to 
negative “competition for market share” effect.  
In strategic trade policy models outlined above, only a final product is considered and only primary 
factors are used in the production process. However, in the real world most industries use in production not 
only primary factors but also intermediate inputs. Furthermore, the rising international trade in intermediate 
inputs reflects the increasing importance of GVCs when production processes span multiple countries, with 
each country specializing in particular stages of a good’s production sequence (Costinot, Vogel, and Wang 
2013). These facts have been recognized in academic literature and a number of papers have emerged 
analyzing various issues of interaction between trade in intermediate inputs and trade policies. In this study 
we focus on the literature which examines effects of domestic export incentives on foreign countries` export 
in the presence of trade in intermediates/GVCs. In order to make analysis more straightforward, we 
distinguish between external effects of export incentives targeted at either final or intermediate goods.   
The seminal paper for the case of external effects of export incentives aiming at domestic final-good 
producers in the presence of intermediate trade is Ishikawa and Spencer (1998). Ishikawa and Spencer 
(1998), under assumption of Cournot competition, conclude that in vertically related industry an export 
subsidy aimed at shifting rents from foreign to domestic final-good producers may also shift rents to 
oligopolistic foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs. Bernhofen (1997), assuming that intermediate good is 
supplied by a foreign monopolist, similarly finds that export subsidy on domestic final-good producer can 
cause a vertical rent-shifting from domestic downstream producer to foreign upstream supplier. In the 
empirical context of this study these theoretical predictions imply that:  
 Proposition 1: Domestic export incentive (e.g. subsidy) implemented in country A for final/higher-tier 
intermediate product X can induce foreign export of intermediate input I from country B to country A used in 
production of subsidized final/higher-tier intermediate product X in country A if foreign suppliers of 
intermediate input I are oligopolistic or monopolistic. In the rest of the paper, we refer to this effect as to 
positive backward linkages` effect.    
 
Theoretical literature on external effects of export incentives aiming at intermediate-good producers also 
allows us to make relevant conclusions. For example, in their influential paper Spencer and Jones (1991) 
study the market structure where, in the home country A, there is a vertically integrated firm controlling 
exports of both an intermediate and a final good. This firm competes in a foreign country B with a firm that 
produces the final good and has the option of either importing the intermediate good or producing it at higher 
cost. In the case of trade in intermediate and final goods, if in home country A profit margins are higher for 
trade in the former, Spencer and Jones show that the optimal policy of country A government is a tax on 
exports of the final good in order to shift toward trade in the intermediate good. Such a policy results in that 
low-cost vertically integrated manufacturer in country A exports an intermediate product, lowering the costs 
of a foreign rival producer of final goods in country B thereby stimulating country B export of respective 
final goods. For the empirical context of our study, these conclusions imply that there can be circumstances 
when a government can be interested in establishing export incentives targeting at intermediate-good 
producers, which in turn will benefit producers in foreign countries who import these intermediate inputs for 
their production of final/higher-tier intermediate goods.   
 Similarly, Lee and Wong (2005) examine the use of export subsidy to encourage domestic production 
of an intermediate input or a final product in a model with international rivalry between firms in two 
countries. Lee and Wong paper is a simple extension of a well-known international duopoly model 
considered in the literature to study the use of export subsidies. They consider two countries, labeled home 
and foreign, and two industries in each country: one for a final good for consumption, and another for an 
intermediate input, which is used exclusively in the production of the final good. Trade between the two 
countries in the intermediate product is allowed, while outputs of the final good are sold in the rest of the 
world. Though Lee and Wong emphasize that they do not want to claim wide applicability of their results 
because of some simplifying assumptions they made, in the context of our study some of their conclusions 
are useful. In particular, according to their model, under certain theoretical assumptions, domestic subsidy for 
intermediate-input producer leads to the increase of output and profit of foreign producer of final good, 
which uses respective intermediate input in her production.   
 Sheldon, Pick, and McCorriston (2001) examine the interaction between export subsidies and profit-
shifting in a vertical production system, where each stage of production downstream from agriculture may be 
characterized by imperfect competition. Their focus is on comparing the profit-shifting effect for the case 
where an export subsidy can be targeted either at a foreign final processed good (i.e. foreign export subsidy 
for final-good producers) or at domestic unprocessed agricultural commodity (i.e. domestic export subsidy 
for unprocessed agricultural commodity producers), where the latter enters the production process for an 
intermediate good subsequently used in production of the final processed good. According to their model, 
domestic export subsidy to the unprocessed agricultural commodity may have greater profit-shifting effects 
in the final goods` market than a downstream foreign export subsidy. In addition, both types of subsidy result 
in profits being shifted from the home to the foreign upstream processing firm.  
Summarizing the above theoretical studies, we arrive at our second proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: Domestic export incentive (e.g. subsidy) implemented in country A for intermediate product I 
can positively affect country B`s export of final/higher-tier intermediate good X which uses intermediate 
product I imported from country A in its production. In the rest of the paper we refer to this effect as to 
positive forward linkages` effect.  
 
3. BRIC COUNTRIES AS A CASE STUDY OF EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC EXPORT INCENTIVES 
ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES` EXPORT 
As was already noted in introduction, BRIC countries are very suitable for this project, firstly, due to their 
rather aggressive export promotion policies in recent years (see, e.g., Evenett 2015) and, secondly, due to 
their rather high inclusion into the word` GVCs and also their high and growing interdependence via GVCs.  
Below we discuss these issues in more detail.   
 
3.1. Export incentives in the BRIC countries in recent years 
In a recent Global Trade Alert (GTA) report of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) authored 
by Evenett (2015), it has been shown that since the Global Crisis began three of the BRICS - Brazil, India, 
and China - have introduced a large number of additional incentives to inflate exports (i.e. export incentives). 
In this section, we briefly overview data on recent BRICs` export incentives according to GTA database. 
This database includes trade measures implemented from 2006 to present but does not necessarily contain all 
implemented measures. First, we report statistics on cumulative number of export incentives by industry (HS 
2007 four-digit codes as reported in GTA database) and year of being in force. In particular, for each BRIC 
country we sum up number of export incentives, which are in force by affected industry in a certain year. E.g. 
if in a country X in a year t one export incentive has been in force and it affects 10 HS four-digit industries, 
our indicator of export incentives for a year t and country X equals to 10. In this way we are able to count not 
just for the number of implemented export incentives but also for their industrial coverage (some incentives 
concern only one HS four-digit industry, some – hundreds) and duration (some measures last only few 
months, some – five and even more years). If export incentive lasts only several months, i.e. less than one 
year, we count for it as 1/12*X where X is duration of the export incentive in months. E.g. for the above 
example if in a country X in a year t one export incentive which affects 10 HS four-digit industries has been 
in force for six months, our indicator of export incentives for a year t and country X equals to 5. Results of 
the computations are reported on Figure 1.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 Number of export incentives in force per industry (HS 2007 four-digit) and year 
 
Source: Author`s calculations based on GTA data.  
 
As we can see India is an obvious leader here. During the period of 2009-2016 Indian cumulative number of 
export incentives per industry-year was about 2 times higher than that of Brazil and China and 7 times higher 
than that of Russia. We next report industrial structure of export incentives per industry-year for the period of 
2009-2016 on Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 Industrial structure of export incentives per industry-year in 2009-2016 
 
Note: Based on HS chapter classification: Animal, vegetable products, food and tobacco (chapters 1-24); Mineral products, chemicals, plastic, rubber (chapters 25-40); Skins, leather, etc. 
(chapters 41-43); Wood, pulp and paper (chapters 44-49); Textiles, footwear, etc. (chapters 50-67); Stones, metals, etc. (chapters 68-83); machinery, vehicles, equipment, instruments 
(chapters 84-92); Other (chapters 92-99).  
 
Source: Author`s calculations based on GTA data.  
 
From the Figure 2 we can see that BRICs implemented most export incentives in machinery, vehicles, 
equipment, instruments` sector (especially its share is high for Russia - about 50%; in China – about 30%; in 
Brazil and India – about 20%). India and China implement significant amount of export incentives in 
agricultural and food industries – about 30 and 20% in total numbers of export incentives, respectively. 
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Finally, BRICs stimulate export rather intensively in Mineral products, chemicals, plastic and rubber sector – 
over 20% of all export incentives in Brazil, about 20% in India, about 15% in China and about 10% in 
Russia.   
 After quantitative analysis of BRICs export incentives, we briefly turn to the qualitative side of the 
problem. According to Evenett (2015) and our assessments India stands out for the number of measures taken 
to boost exports through subsidized trade finance. Many of BRICs export incentives involve tax refunds or 
reductions for firms engaged in exporting. China mostly implement Value Added Tax (VAT) rebates and 
reductions: 17 out of 27 export incentives reported in GTA database concern VAT.   
 
3.2. BRIC countries` participation in the world`s GVCs 
When it comes to measurement of GVCs participation, the most known approach is the Hummels, Ishii, and 
Yi (2001) indicator of “vertical specialization” and its refinement by Koopman, Powers, Wang, and Wei 
(2011). Value chain participation is defined in terms of the origin of the value added embodied in exports 
both looking backward and forward from a reference country: backward is represented by foreign value 
added embodied in exports, and forward is represented by domestic value added which is used as inputs to 
produce exports in the destination country (Kowalski, Gonzalez, Ragoussis, and Ugarte (2015)). On Figures 
3 and 4 we present relevant indicators for BRIC countries which are readily available in OECD-TiVA 
database.  
Figure 3 Foreign value added share of gross exports (backward GVCs participation index) in the BRICs, %                                                                                           
 
Note: According to OECD-TiVA definition backward GVC participation index captures the extent to which domestic firms use foreign intermediate value added 
for exporting activities in a given country. 
Source: OECD-TiVA data.  
 
Figure 4 Domestic value added in exports of intermediate products as a share of total gross foreign exports (forward GVCs 
participation index) in the BRICs, %                                        
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Note: According to OECD-TiVA definition forward GVC participation index captures the extent to which a given country’s exports are used by firms in partner 
countries as inputs into their own exports.  
Source: OECD-TiVA data.   
 
As we can see from the Figures, only India`s backward participation index has increased dramatically in the 
period (from 9.36 to 24.1). Otherwise, both indices have been rather stable for the BRIC countries in 1995-
2011. China has the highest participation in backward linkages of the world GVCs followed by India. Russia 
and Brazil, on the other hand, participate significantly more than India and China in forward linkages of the 
world GVCs. These are expectable trends, as, on the one hand, China and India are widely recognized as the 
world`s manufacturing hubs, and, on the other hand, Brazil and Russia are among the world`s largest 
suppliers of natural resources used as inputs in production of various goods and services worldwide.    
On Figure 5 we depict backward against forward GVCs participation indices for all countries for 
which data is available in OECD-TiVA database for the year 2011 (last available data point).  
Figure 5 Backward versus forward GVCs participation indices by country in 2011, % 
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Source: OECD-TiVA data.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, Brazil and Russia are in the cluster of resource abundant countries with high 
forward GVCs participation index and low backward GVCs participation index while China and India are in 
the cluster of countries with more advanced industrial structure with relatively equal indices ranging between 
30 and 40%.  
 Trends in intermediate goods` trade are also indicative of GVCs formation because fragmented 
production processes require that parts, components, and partially manufactured subassemblies cross 
borders—sometimes more than once—before final goods are produced and shipped to final markets 
(Feenstra 1998; Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001; Sturgeon and Mevedovic 2011). On Figures 6 and 7 we 
present intermediate goods` trade volumes (export plus import) of the BRICs and their annual growth rates, 
respectively.  
Figure 6 Trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods in the BRICs, billion USD, 1995-2015 
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Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification.  
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
Figure 7 Growth rates of trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods in the BRICs, %, 1995-2015 
 
Note: 1) Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification; 2) Growth rates have been computed as 
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Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
As we can see from the Figures, though in recent decades BRICs` intermediate trade has been growing, the 
growth rates have been decreasing and have become even negative in 2014-2015 for all the BRICs.  
Figures 6 and 7 provide us with the picture of respective trade dynamics in absolute terms. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at these trends relative to total trade of the BRICs and to world trade in 
intermediate goods. On Figures 8 and 9 we present these indicators.  
Figure 8 Trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods as percentage of total trade volume of the BRICs, 1995-
2015 
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Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.  
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
Figure 9 BRICs trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods as percentage of world trade volume of 
intermediate goods, 1995-2015 
 
Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.  
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
From Figure 8 we can conclude that BRICs` trade structure with respect to intermediate versus final goods 
have been rather stable in recent decades with highest share of intermediates in Brazilian and Indian trade 
and lowest – in Chinese trade. On the other hand, from Figure 9 we can further see that China`s role in the 
world trade of intermediate goods is rather significant with a strong growing tendency. Brazil, Russia and 
India do not seem to be even close to China on that score.  
 In Figure 10 we present shares of processed intermediates in total intermediate trade volumes of the 
BRICs.  
Figure 10 Share of processed intermediates in total intermediate trade volume (export plus import) in the BRICs, %, 1998-
2015 
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Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.  
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
As we can see, China exhibits the highest share of processed intermediates in its intermediate trade among 
the BRICs and Russia – the lowest.   
Finally, on Figures A1.1-A1.4 in Appendix 1, we present the structure of intermediate goods` exports 
of the BRICs according to BEC classification2. As we can see, Brazilian intermediate export has been rather 
diversified with dominance of processed and primary industrial supplies. Primary fuels and lubricants 
dominate in Russian intermediate export. Processed industrial supplies strongly dominate in Indian 
intermediate export. Finally, processed and primary industrial supplies prevail in Chinese intermediate 
export.  
Overall, this brief descriptive analysis enables us to conclude that BRIC countries` participation in the 
world`s GVCs have been rather high and stable in recent years which is good in the context of this study. 
Furthermore, BRIC countries seem to have differential roles in the world`s GVCs with Brazil and Russia 
providing core inputs for global production and China and India serving as the world`s manufacturing hubs 
(China also stands out for specializing in more processed goods compared to other BRICs). This makes 
BRICs bloc a particularly interesting example for comparative analysis.  
 
3.3. BRICs participation in each other`s global value chains 
                                                          
2 The purpose of the classification is to analyze international trade statistics by large economic classes of commodities, 
distinguishing food, industrial supplies, capital equipment, consumer durables and consumer non-durables.  
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In recent years, BRIC countries` participation in each other’s GVCs has been on rise. From Figures 11-14 we 
can see that between the years of 1995 and 2011 value added in export by the other three BRICs have 
increased for Brazil from 1.53 to 12.68%, for Russia from 2.67 to 12.32%, for India from 5.23 to 11.94% and 
for China from 4.65 to 7.08%. However, it should be noted that for Brazil, Russia and India most of this 
increase comes from China`s value added. On the other hand, China has the lowest share of BRICs value 
added in its export among the BRICs so it has also increased during the period by 1.5 times. We can also see 
that the shares of US, EU and Japan value added in BRIC countries` export either have decreased or have not 
changed in the period though they still remain high.  
Figure 11                                                                       Figure 12 
 
Figure 13                                                                       Figure 14 
 
Source: Author`s calculations based on OECD-TiVA data.  
 
Next, we look at inter-BRICs trade in intermediate goods presented on Figures 15-18.  
Figure 15                                                                              Figure 16 
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Figure 17                                                                              Figure 18 
   
Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.  
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
As we can see from the Figures, bilateral trade in intermediates between China, on the one hand, and Brazil, 
Russia and India, on the other hand, have been especially on rise in recent years.  
Finally, on Figures A2.1-A2.12 in Appendix 2, we present the structure of intermediate goods` 
exports in inter-BRICs trade according to BEC. It appears that Brazil largely exports intermediates of food 
and fuel industries to other BRICs. Russian intermediate export to Brazil and India largely consists of 
processed industrial supplies though Russian intermediate export to China is mainly primary fuels. Processed 
industrial supplies dominate in Indian intermediate export in inter-BRICs trade. India also exports rather 
significant amounts of parts and accessories of capital goods (including transport equipment) to Brazil and 
Russia. China`s main export categories in inter-BRICs intermediate trade are processed industrial supplies, 
parts and accessories of capital goods (including transport equipment).  
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On the whole, it can be concluded that at present BRICs interdependence via GVCs is rather high 
and, in general, has been growing in recent years. Individual roles of each BRIC country in common GVCs 
seem to have its own unique characteristics.  
 
4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages (Proposition 2)  
Empirical test of the impact of export policy (whether it is foreign or domestic) on export must control for 
other determinants of trade. We adopt a gravity approach to our data and augment it to include export policy 
measures. Specifically, for each country of interest (denoted by X, which is one of the BRIC countries) we 
estimate the following equation:  
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(1). 
 
XtiSHEX ,,_  / XtiSHEX ,1,_  is country X export share in the world export of an industry i (HS 2007, six-
digit level) in a year t / t-1 (2008,…,2015). The data comes from UN COMTRADE. The use of export shares 
in world markets and not export flows as dependent variable is reasonable in the context of this study, first 
and utmost, because export incentives originally target at capturing market shares of foreign rivals in export 
markets. In our case, we are then able to test if domestic export incentives actually can help foreign exporters 
to capture additional market shares in the world markets taking into account the strength of their relevant 
GVCs linkages with the country implementing these incentives. However, for robustness checking purposes 
we also estimate a version of equation (1) with export flows as dependent variable (see equation (4) below).  
  XtSHWGDP ,_  is the share of GDP of country X in the World GDP in a year t (2009-2015). The 
data comes from World Bank. XtTF ,  is Trade Freedom component of Index of Economic Freedom of 
Heritage foundation of country X in a year t (2009-2015). XtiEI ,, is number of export incentives in industry i 
(HS 2007, four-digit level) which are in force in a year t (2009,…, 2015) in country X. If export incentive 
lasts only several months, i.e. less than one year, we count for it as 1/12*X where X is duration of the export 
incentive in months. Data comes from GTA database3.  
 Next six variables are variables of interest in this study. 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisOFFDFLI  and 
3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisDFLI   are indices which count for forward linkages across off-diagonal and diagonal 
elements, respectively, in respective bilateral input-output tables and are calculated as follows:  
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where )(is is a broad sector (ISIC rev. 3 two-digit or broader sector as available in OECD-TiVA database on 
origin of value added in gross export by exporting and source country-sector and reported in Table 1) which 
includes industry i (HS 2007, six-digit level); )(issn  is a broad ISIC sector which is not )(is .  
 
Table 1 ISIC rev. 3 broad sectors used in the study for construction of forward and backward linkages` indices  
ISIC rev. 3 sectors Description 
C01T05  Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
C10T14  Mining and quarrying 
                                                          
3 This database includes trade measures implemented from 2006 but does not necessarily contain all implemented measures. 
Originally, GTA data is reported for four-digit HS 2007 industries. We should also note that while constructing export incentives` 
variables we consider only those export incentives, which, by GTA definition, are “implemented and almost certainly discriminate 
against foreign commercial interests” (in GTA classification they are marked by red color). 
 
C15T16  Food products, beverages and tobacco 
C17T19  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
C20  Wood and products of wood and cork 
C21T22  Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and 
publishing 
C23  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel 
C24  Chemicals and chemical products 
C25  Rubber and plastics products 
C26  Other non-metallic mineral products 
C27  Basic metals 
C28  Fabricated metal products 
C29  Machinery and equipment, nec  
C30T33  Electrical and optical equipment 
C34  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
C35  Other transport equipment 
C36T37  Manufacturing nec; recycling  
Source: OECD-TiVA 
 
BRIC1/2/3 is one of the BRIC countries which is not X; t denotes year (2009,…,2015); FLI denotes forward 
linkages` index and OFFD/D – off-diagonal/diagonal elements of respective input-output table. NFEI 
denotes export incentives, which are in force in denoted sector, year and country and which do not concern 
final products (i.e. only export incentive for primary and processed intermediates are included). VAinEXP 
denotes value added (VA) of denoted country, industry and year in export (EXP) of denoted country, 
industry and year. Data on value added comes from OECD-TiVA database on origin of value added in gross 
export by exporting and source country-sector. Data is available up to 2011 and, hence, for the years of 2012-
2015 we use data of 2011.    
 The first indicator, 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisOFFDFLI , defines the weighted sum of export incentives for 
intermediates which are in force in country BRIC1/2/3 in year t in sectors )(issn   with weights as ratios of 
value added of country BRIC1/2/3 sector )(issn   in country X gross export of sector )(is  to respective 
value added of the world in year t (i.e. ratios have been computed for off-diagonal elements in respective 
bilateral input-output tables from OECD_TiVA database). The second indicator, 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisDFLI , 
defines export incentives for intermediates which are in force in country BRIC1/2/3 in year t in sector )(is
weighted by ratio of value added of country BRIC1/2/3 sector )(is  in country X gross export of sector )(is  
to respective value added of the world in year t (i.e. ratios have been computed for diagonal elements in 
respective bilateral input-output OECD-TiVA tables).   
  Finally, we control for time fixed effects, YD
t
t .  
 As was mentioned above for robustness checking purposes we also estimate version of equation (1) 
for export flows: 
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          (4), 
where  XtiLnEX ,,  / XtiLnEX ,1,  is natural logarithm of country X export in industry i (HS 2007, six-digit 
level) in a year t / t-1 (2008,…,2015). XtLnGDP,  is natural logarithm of country X GDP in year t 
(2009,…,2015). Both variables are in US dollars and have been transformed into real values using US GDP 
deflator. Data for export flows comes from UN COMTRADE. Data for GDP and US GDP deflator come 
from World Bank. The other variables have been defined above.  
We suggest that if 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisOFFDFLI  and 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisDFLI  are positively related to 
XtiSHEX ,,_  / XtiLnEX ,, , then we can conclude that export incentives for intermediates implemented in 
one country positively affect export of the other country via GVCs forward linkages. If the respective 
relationship is negative for 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisDFLI , it can be concluded that negative “competition for market 
share” effects within sector )(is  dominate. If this relationship is negative for 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisOFFDFLI , the 
interpretation is not that straightforward. In particular, this actually means that export incentives for 
intermediates in one country in sectors other than )(is  negatively affect export of the other country in sector 
)(is  given that sectors )(issn  of the former country provide high value added for export of sector )(is in 
the latter country. It can be suggested then that export incentives of the first country in sectors )(issn   also 
positively affect this country`s export in sector )(is  via spillovers which in turn cause significant negative 
“competition for market share” effects for the export in this sector of the second country. Similar effects can 
also exist within sector )(is  and, hence, this way of argumentation can be also used for explanation of 
negative relationship between 3/2/1,),(_ BRICtisDFLI  and XtiSHEX ,,_ / XtiLnEX ,, .  
 
Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs backward linkages (Proposition 1) 
To test for export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs backward linkages we estimate the 
following equation: 
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where XtoYtiSHEX ,,_  is share of country X export to country Y in the world export to country Y of an 
industry i (HS 2007, six-digit level) in a year t / t-1 (2008,…,2015). X and Y denote two BRIC countries. The 
data comes from UN COMTRADE. XtSHWGDP ,_  / YtSHWGDP ,_ , XtTF , / YtTF ,  and XtiEI ,,  were 
defined above.  
 Last two variables are variables of our interest. They are calculated as follows: 
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where BLI denotes backward linkages` index. NPIEI denotes export incentives, which are in force in denoted 
sector, year and country and which do not concern primary intermediate products (i.e. only export incentives 
for processed intermediates and final goods are included).  
 The first indicator, XYtisOFFDBLI ,),(_ , defines the weighted sum of export incentives for final and 
processed intermediate goods which are in force in country Y in year t in sectors )(issn    with weights as 
ratios of value added of country X  sector )(is  in country Y gross export of sectors )(issn   to respective 
value added of the world in year t (i.e. ratios have been computed for off-diagonal elements in respective 
bilateral input-output tables from OECD_TiVA database). The second indicator, XYtisDBLI ,),(_ , defines 
export incentives for final and processed intermediate goods which are in force in country Y in year t in 
sector )(is weighted by ratio of value added of country X sector )(is  in country Y gross export of sector )(is  
to respective value added of the world in year t (i.e. ratios have been computed for diagonal elements in 
respective bilateral input-output tables from OECD_TiVA database).    
 For robustness checking purposes, we also estimate version of equation (5) for export flows: 
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where  XtoYtiLnEX ,,  / XtoYtiLnEX ,1,  is natural logarithm of country X export to country Y in an industry i 
(HS 2007, six-digit level) in a year t / t-1 (2008,…,2015). It has been transformed into real values using US 
GDP deflator. Other variables have been defined above.  
We suggest that if XYtisOFFDBLI ,),(_  and XYtisDBLI ,),(_  are positively related to 
XtoYtiSHEX ,,_  / XtoYtiLnEX ,, then it can be concluded that export incentives for final and processed 
intermediate goods implemented in one country positively affect export of the other country to this country 
via GVCs backward linkages. If this relationship is negative for XYtisDBLI ,),(_ then we can suggest that 
negative competition effects dominate as increased local production in sector )(is in country Y due to export 
incentives means less import and, hence, less export from country X to country Y in this sector. Negative 
relationship between XYtisOFFDBLI ,),(_ and XtoYtiSHEX ,,_ / XtoYtiLnEX ,,  would support theoretical 
predictions of Baldwin and Venables (2015) who developed a model in which the interaction of forward and 
backward linkages determines the range of goods and of parts that are produced in a developing economy. 
Based on this model they show that support for final goods producers can increase the range of parts 
produced, broadening the industrial base. In the context of our study this suggests that if export incentives for 
final and processed intermediate goods in country Y in sector )(is have positive spillover effects for other 
sectors )(issn  in country Y which produces inputs for sector )(is , there can be less import in these 
sectors from country X.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages  
We estimate equations (1) and (4) using panel version of Tobit model with random effects because of 
excessive number of zeros in our dependent  variables. For robustness checking purposes we also report 
results for ordinary panel model with fixed effects. Results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Desriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix are provided in Appendix 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: Dependent variable is export shares in 
world export by industry 
 Brazil Russia India China 
Tobit with 
RE 
Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with 
RE 
Ordinary 
panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Constant -0,038 
(0.035) 
0,014 (0.033) -0,076 
(0.017)*** 
-0,078 
(0.029)*** 
-0,068 (0.045) 0,241 (0.046)*** 11,08 (1.505)*** 11,032 (1.907)*** 
EX_SH(i,t-1,X) 0,942 
(0.002)*** 
0,253 (0.005)*** 0,938 
(0.002)*** 
0,333 
(0.005)*** 
0,919 
(0.003)*** 
0,199 (0.007)*** 0,974 (0.002)*** 0,531 (0.005)*** 
WGDP_SH(t,X) -4,931 
(2.294)** 
2,724 (2.464) 1,425 
(1.242) 
3,149 
(2.081) 
29,249 
(4.286)*** 
30,979 (5.723)*** 0,00000001 
(0.000000001)*** 
0,00000002 
(0.000000001)*** 
TF(t,X) 0,001 (0.001) -0,0002 (0.001) 0,001 
(0.0002)*** 
0,001 
(0.0004)*** 
-0,0004 
(0.001) 
-0,004 (0.001)*** -0,158 (0.021)*** -0,156 (0.027)*** 
EI(i,t,X) 0,001 
(0.0001)*** 
0,0002 (0.0002) 0,0004 
(0.0002)* 
-0,00003 
(0.0002) 
0,001 
(0.0001)*** 
0,0002 (0.0002) 0,002 (0.0003)*** 0,008 (0.001)*** 
FLI_OFFD_BR 
(s(i),t) 
  -0,0004 
(0.0001)*** 
-0,0001 
(0.0002) 
0,001 
(0.0003)** 
0,0001 (0.001) -0,001 (0.0002)*** -0,002 
(0.0003)*** 
FLI_D_BR 
(s(i),t) 
  0,011 
(0.004)*** 
0,0003 
(0.006) 
-0,004 (0.008) 0,016 (0.017) -0,035 (0.006)*** -0,027 (0.009)*** 
FLI_OFFD_RU 
(s(i),t) 
-0,0003 
(0.0001)*** 
0,0002 
(0.0001)*** 
  -0,0004 
(0.0003) 
-0,001 (0.0003)** 0,0003 (0.0002) 0,0003 (0.0002) 
FLI_D_RU 
(s(i),t) 
-0,0001 
(0.002) 
-0,003 (0.002)*   0,002 (0.005) 0,009 (0.005)* -0,011 (0.005)** -0,008 (0.005)* 
FLI_OFFD_IN 
(s(i),t) 
0,0002 
(0.0001)*** 
0,0001 (0.0001)** -0,0002 
(0.0001)* 
-0,0004 
(0.0002)** 
  0,001 (0.0002)*** 0,001 (0.0003)*** 
FLI_D_IN 
(s(i),t) 
0,001 
(0.001)** 
0,001 (0.001) -0,001 
(0.0004)*** 
-0,001 
(0.001) 
  0,005 (0.001)*** 0,003 (0.001)** 
FLI_OFFD_CH 
(s(i),t) 
0,0001 
(0.00002)*** 
0,00002 (0.00004) 0,000004 
(0.00002) 
-0,00001 
(0.00004) 
-0,0001 
(0.00003)*** 
-0,0004 (0.0001)***   
FLI_D_CH 
(s(i),t) 
-0,001 
(0.0003)*** 
-0,002 (0.001)*** -0,001 
(0.0001)*** 
-0,001 
(0.0003)** 
0,002 
(0.0004)*** 
-0,001 (0.002) 
 
 
Log likelihood 80122.048  75774.151  47132.509  45930.295  
Wald chi2 
(Prob.) 
186186.3 
(0.0000) 
 190185.27 
(0.0000) 
 84001.00 
(0.0000) 
 Not reported  
N. of left-
censored (zero) 
obs.  
4,584  4,189  1,367  1,671  
N. obs.  31,776 31,776 31,776 31,776 27,224 27,224 31,776 31,776 
R-sq. (overall)  0.918  0.869  0.676  0.914 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: Dependent variable is natural logarithm of 
export flows by industry  
 Brazil Russia India China 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary 
panel with 
FE 
Constant 292,903 
(267.873) 
-606,62 (289.446)** -3,941 (2.31)* -65,562 (26.861)** -10,538 
(3.113)*** 
43,285 (73.069) 185,964 
(179.936) 
22,357 
(210.646) 
LnEX (i,t-1,X) 0,99 
(0.003)*** 
0,119 (0.006)*** 0,933 
(0.003)*** 
0,243 (0.006)*** 0,918 (0.003)*** 0,171 (0.006)*** 0,985 
(0.002)*** 
0,322 
(0.006)*** 
LnGDP(t,X) -10,673 
(9.801) 
23,106 (10.526)** Omitted  1,873 (0.894)** Omitted -0,67 (2.326) 2,539 (2.026) 1,332 
(2.315) 
TF(t,X) 0,095 (0.141) -0,474 (0.133)*** 0,056 (0.036) 0,317 (0.068)*** 0,164 (0.046)*** -0,191 (0.115)* -3,646 (3.349) -0,707 
(3.897) 
EI(i,t,X) 0,168 
(0.026)*** 
-0,035 (0.036) 0,02 (0.044) -0,357 (0.039)*** 0,072 (0.007)*** 0,012 (0.012) 0,028 
(0.01)*** 
-0,03 
(0.048) 
FLI_OFFD_BR  
(s(i),t) 
  -0,047 
(0.019)** 
-0,057 (0.034)* 0,015 (0.016) -0,089 (0.055) -0,016 
(0.006)** 
-0,029 
(0.011)*** 
FLI_D_BR 
(s(i),t) 
  0,639 (0.749) 1,634 (1.221) 0,299 (0.437) 4,845 (0.946)*** -0,393 
(0.176)** 
-0,263 
(0.289) 
FLI_OFFD_RU 
(s(i),t) 
-0,152 
(0.025)*** 
-0,095 (0.021)***   0,022 (0.015) -0,046 (0.014)*** -0,005 (0.008) -0,006 
(0.007) 
FLI_D_RU 
(s(i),t) 
0,681 (0.534) 0,58 (0.393)   -0,827 
(0.291)*** 
0,636 (0.286)** -0,098 (0.177) -0,112 
(0.161) 
FLI_OFFD_IN 
(s(i),t) 
0,074 
(0.015)*** 
0,047 (0.017)*** 0,004 (0.021) -0,065 (0.034)*   0,021 
(0.007)*** 
0,003 (0.01) 
FLI_D_IN 
(s(i),t) 
0,439 
(0.133)*** 
0,432 (0.141)*** -0,188 
(0.079)** 
-0,458 (0.141)***   0,042 (0.031) -0,034 
(0.04) 
FLI_OFFD_CH 
(s(i),t) 
0,009 
(0.004)** 
-0,003 (0.009) 0,006 (0.004) 
/pv=0.107/ 
-0,001 (0.008) 0,008 (0.001)*** -0,002 (0.005)   
FLI_D_CH 
(s(i),t) 
-0,211 
(0.083)** 
-0,126 (0.162) -0,003 (0.029)  0,143 (0.061)** 0,018 (0.024) 0,019 (0.095) 
 
 
Log likelihood -71147.599  -72887.661  -58786.195  -60839.619  
Wald chi2 
(Prob.) 
98428.45 
(0.0000) 
 86442.38 
(0.0000) 
 81763.73 
(0.0000) 
 192500.55 
(0.0000) 
 
N. of left-
censored (zero) 
obs.  
4,672  4,277  1,455  1,759  
N. obs.  31,864 31,864 31,864 31,864 27,312 27,312 31,864 31,864 
R-sq. (overall)  0.763  0.662  0.694  0.876 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
 
First, we should note that interpretation of Tobit coefficients is not straightforward. In particular, Tobit 
regression coefficients are interpreted in a similar manner to OLS regression coefficients; however, the linear 
effect is on the uncensored latent variable, not the observed outcome. The expected export share changes by 
coefficient for each unit increase in the corresponding predictor. E.g. if we take the coefficient of 
CHtisOFFDFLI ,),(_ in the Tobit regression for Brazilian export shares (column 1, Table 2), we can say that 
if industry i were to increase its CHtisOFFDFLI ,),(_  by one point, expected export share in this industry 
would increase by 0.0001 points while holding all other variables in the model constant. Thus, the higher 
CHtisOFFDFLI ,),(_ , the higher the predicted export share. Or, in other words, the higher the number of 
export incentives implemented in China for intermediates in sectors )(issn   which are intensively used as 
value added in Brazilian exportable production in sector )(is , the higher the predicted Brazilian export share 
in the world market in industry i.  
For illustrative purposes, we summarize our results in Tables 4 and 5.  
Table 4 Summary of results for off-diagonal forward linkages 
Export incentives implemented in: Export of: Impact 
Brazil Russia Strong negative 
India Very weak positive 
China Strong negative 
Russia Brazil Weak negative 
India Weak negative 
China - 
India Brazil Strong positive 
Russia Strong negative 
China Rather strong positive 
China Brazil Weak positive 
Russia Very weak positive 
India Very weak negative 
Note: Positive impacts are denoted by different shades of blue; negative – by different shades of orange. Darker shades correspond to stronger effects.  
 
Table 5 Summary of results for diagonal forward linkages 
Export incentives implemented in: Export of: Impact 
Brazil Russia Very weak positive 
India Very weak positive 
China Rather strong negative 
Russia Brazil Very weak negative 
India - 
China Weak negative 
India Brazil Rather strong positive 
Russia Rather strong negative 
China Weak positive 
China Brazil Rather strong negative 
Russia - 
India Very weak positive 
Note: Positive impacts are denoted by different shades of blue; negative – by different shades of orange. Darker shades correspond to stronger effects.  
 
 
As we can see the evidence on which effects dominate – positive or negative - is inconclusive though we can 
notice that strong and rather strong negative effects are found more often than strong and rather strong 
positive effects (6 against 3 times). In general, this indicates that at the average GVCs linkages between 
BRICs are not strong enough to significantly suppress negative “competition for market shares” effects 
coming from each other’s export incentives. We can see that Russian export seems to suffer most from 
negative effects of export incentives for intermediates implemented in the other three BRICs. It gets most 
negative effects from Indian export incentives for intermediates. This evidence enables us to conclude that, 
on the one hand, Russian GVCs linkages with the other three BRICs can be rather weak, and, on the other 
hand, negative “competition for market share” effects between Russia and the other three BRICs can be too 
strong.   
Largest positive effects come from Indian export incentives for intermediates to Brazilian export.  
Also Chinese export benefits rather significantly from Indian export incentives for intermediates. These 
results indicate that GVCs forward linkages between India, on the one hand, and Brazil and China, on the 
other hand, are rather strong which makes possible the situation when Brazil and China get more positive 
effects than negative from export incentives for intermediates implemented in India. In particular, according 
to our framework, when Indian intermediates become more accessible due to domestic export incentives, 
Brazilian and Chinese exportable production, where these Indian intermediates are used intensively, becomes 
more competitive in the world markets.  
 
Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages 
In Tables 6-13 we provide estimation results for equations (5) and (8). Here we also report panel version of 
Tobit model with random effects and ordinary panel model with fixed effects. We should mention that we 
delete all observations for those industries for which we have only zeros or not available data for all years in 
the studied period 2008-2015 as estimation algorithms do not converge due to too large numbers of zero 
observations.  
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: Brazil, dependent variable is bilateral 
export shares in world export by industry 
X to Brazil: Russia to Brazil India to Brazil China to Brazil 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Constant -0,797 (4.981) -12,076 (11.317) 3,418 (0.976)*** 0,291 (0.67) -0,033 (0.026) 1,512 (1.238) 
EX_SH(i,t-1,XtoY(BR)) 0,412 (0.051)*** -0,119 (0.032)*** -0,032 (0.006)*** -0,015 (0.005)*** 0,539 (0.012)*** 0,221 (0.007)*** 
WGDP_SH(t,X)  -1479,475 
(1276.791) 
-33,182 (50.034) 22,673 (34.471) 0,000000004 (0.000000001)*** 0,00000002 
(0.000000005)*** 
WGDP_SH(t,BR) 27,479 (38.759) 1811,628 
(1565.406) 
-37,093 (21.88)* 3,899 (15.104) 8,534 (5.533) 64,165 (16.512)*** 
TF(t,X) -0,001 (0.016) 0,082 (0.075) -0,006 (0.002)*** -0,002 (0.001)* Omitted -0,066 (0.023)*** 
TF(t,BR) 0,009 (0.053) 0,055 (0.057) -0,04 (0.011)*** -0,003 (0.008) Omitted 0,04 (0.011)*** 
EI(i,t,X) 0,009 (0.013) -0,008 (0.012) 0,008 (0.001)*** 0,002 (0.001)*** 0,014 (0.002)*** 0,011 (0.005)** 
FLI_ND_X_BR (s(i),t) 0,004 (0.001)*** 0,005 (0.003)* 0,0001 (0.001) 0,0003 (0.0005) 0,001 (0.0001)*** 0,0005 (0.0001)*** 
FLI_D_X_BR (s(i),t) -0,097 (0.034)*** -0,126 (0.068)* 0,048 (0.017)*** 0,028 (0.015)* -0,021 (0.004)*** -0,022 (0.005)*** 
Log likelihood -431.09143  2662.6051  2738.4713  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) 81.75 (0.0000)  165.44 (0.0000)  Not reported  
N. of left-censored (zero) 
obs.  
1,210  6,851  3,799  
N. obs.  1,959 1,959 17,949 17,949 24,711 24,711 
R-sq. (overall)  0.018  0.025  0.641 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 7 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: Brazil, dependent variable is natural 
logarithm of bilateral export flows by industry 
X to Brazil: Russia to Brazil India to Brazil China to Brazil 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Constant -147,553 (184.169) -176,045 (285.941) 158,17 (59.593)*** 1,682 (74.755) -21,616 (43.911) -169,913 
(31.285)*** 
LnEX (i,t-1,XtoY (BR)) 0,844 (0.057)*** 0,03 (0.015)* 0,699 (0.038)*** 0,025 (0.008)*** 0,903 (0.005)*** 0,134 (0.007)*** 
LnGDP(t,X) 3,205 (2.008) -13,58 (18.008)  0,814 (1.496) -0,189 (0.652) 3,525 (0.739)*** 
LnGDP(t,BR)  19,604 (25.633) -3,391 (0.963)*** 0,634 (0.495) 1,102 (0.412)*** 1,741 (0.385)*** 
TF(t,X) -0,079 (0.428) 0,114 (0.264) 0,44 (0.087)*** -0,199 (0.054)***  -0,284 (0.418) 
TF(t,BR) 0,829 (1.572) -0,029 (0.689) -1,328 (0.594)** -0,327 (0.364) -0,052 (0.233) 0,658 (0.214)*** 
EI(i,t,X) -0,153 (0.381) -0,147 (0.153) 0,284 (0.033)*** 0,022 (0.033) 0,178 (0.027)*** -0,079 (0.103) 
FLI_ND_X_BR (s(i),t) 0,18 (0.049)*** -0,095 (0.04)** -0,02 (0.018) -0,083 (0.032)** 0,0001 (0.001) 0,003 (0.002) 
FLI_D_X_BR (s(i),t) -0,144 (1.127) 3,679 (0.889)*** 1,476 (0.559)*** 0,763 (0.972) 0,063 (0.053) -0,404 (0.101)*** 
Log likelihood -8629.1928  -37961.815  -62612.688  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) 379.55 (0.0000)  574.34 (0.0000)  35873.84 (0.0000)  
N. of left-censored (zero) 
obs.  
3,333  6,495  4,190  
N. obs.  5,201 5,201 16,506 16,506 25,158 25,158 
R-sq. (overall)  0.033  0.042  0.468 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 8 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: Russia, dependent variable is bilateral 
export shares in world export by industry 
X to Russia: Brazil to Russia India to Russia China to Russia 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Constant -0,354 (0.892) -1,502 (1.05) -0,451 (0.24)* -0,066 (0.154) -0,117 (0.013)*** 21,561 (2.898)*** 
EX_SH(i,t-1,XtoY(RU)) 0,666 (0.016)*** 0,3 (0.01)*** 0,588 (0.015)*** 0,134 (0.009)*** 0,554 (0.015)*** 0,229 (0.006)*** 
WGDP_SH(t,X) 6,974 (6.303) 196,818 (146.208) 142,267 
(58.798)** 
15,66 (36.632) 0,00000001 (0.000000001)*** 0,00000001 
(0.000000001)*** 
WGDP_SH(t,RU)  -162,137 
(119.221) 
45,923 (19.132)** 6,982 (12.079) 30,493 (3.878)*** 38,896 (5.53)*** 
TF(t,X) 0,003 (0.01) 0,008 (0.005) -0,003 (0.001)*** -0,0002 (0.001)  -0,315 (0.043)*** 
TF(t,RU) 0,001 (0.003) 0,01 (0.007) 0,0004 (0.0005) 0,0004 (0.0004)  0,012 (0.002)*** 
EI(i,t,X) 0,005 (0.002)*** -0,002 (0.001)* 0,002 (0.001)*** -0,0002 (0.001) 0,014 (0.002)*** 0,003 (0.005) 
FLI_ND_X_RU (s(i),t) 0,004 (0.001)*** 0,003 (0.0003)*** 0,001 (0.0005)** 0,0003 (0.0003) 0,0002 (0.00004)*** 0,0001 
(0.00003)*** 
FLI_D_X_RU (s(i),t) -0,085 (0.083) -0,073 (0.045) 
/pv=0.103/ 
0,012 (0.037) 0,029 (0.024) -0,003 (0.003) 0,004 (0.003) 
Log likelihood 3228.2584  3361.5314  6926.494  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) 1865.41 (0.0000)  1690.83 (0.0000)  Not reported  
N. of left-censored (zero) 
obs.  
5,142  7,144  3,744  
N. obs.  9,017 9,017 15,901 15,901 26,386 26,386 
R-sq. (overall)  0.66  0.507  0.664 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 9 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: Russia, dependent variable is natural 
logarithm of bilateral export flows by industry 
X to Russia: Brazil to Russia India to Russia China to Russia 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Constant -325,25 (466.842) 169,115 (235.751) -81,108 (30.862)*** -322,751 
(38.204)*** 
-2509,803 (267.842)*** 109,111 
(40.909)*** 
LnEX (i,t-1,XtoY (RU)) 0,923 (0.036)*** 0,11 (0.011)*** 0,865 (0.037)*** 0,036 (0.009)*** 0,906 (0.004)*** 0,097 (0.006)*** 
LnGDP(t,X) 27,324 (41.983) -11,315 (21.043)  10,068 (1.204)*** 4,637 (0.5)*** 2,412 (0.173)*** 
LnGDP(t,RU) -16,766 (29.513) 7,995 (14.778)  1,645 (0.306)***  1,191 (0.183)*** 
TF(t,X) 0,068 (1.117) -0,876 (0.572) 0,775 (0.323)** -0,055 (0.032)* 35,639 (3.845)*** -2,969 (0.696)*** 
TF(t,RU) 0,172 (0.434) -0,114 (0.219) 0,376 (0.135)*** 0,02 (0.018) -2,504 (0.278)*** 0,123 (0.03)*** 
EI(i,t,X) 1,006 (0.208)*** -0,03 (0.137) 0,267 (0.032)*** -0,005 (0.038) 0,189 (0.022)*** 0,184 (0.103)* 
FLI_ND_X_RU (s(i),t) 0,141 (0.068)** -0,021 (0.035) 0,013 (0.03) 0,015 (0.02) -0,001 (0.001)* -0,003 (0.001)*** 
FLI_D_X_RU (s(i),t) -7,463 (10.136) 1,455 (4.937) 0,000000001 
(0.000000002) 
0,000000002 
(0.000000001) 
0,198 (0.064)*** 0,046 (0.055) 
Log likelihood -16315.893  -35101.387  -68927.242  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) 783.23 (0.0000)  956.93 (0.0000)  46131.10 (0.0000)  
N. of left-censored (zero) 
obs.  
5,148  7,225  4,152  
N. obs.  9,024 9,024 15,993 15,993 28,171 28,171 
R-sq. (overall)  0.278  0.0823  0.433 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 10 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: India, dependent variable is bilateral 
export shares in world export by industry 
X to India: Brazil to India Russia to India China to India 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Constant -0,06 (0.611) 0,735 (0.376)* -2,632 (2.039) 0,884 (1.331) -0,228 (0.107)** -55,647 
(26.572)** 
EX_SH(i,t-1,XtoY(IN)) 0,508 (0.015)*** 0,186 (0.009)*** 0,375 (0.013)*** 0,101 (0.009)*** 0,651 (0.015)*** 0,255 (0.007)*** 
WGDP_SH(t,X) 2,302 (13.896) -16,084 (8.208)* 362,77 (284.916) -121,386 
(186.083) 
-0,00000001 (0.00000001)* -0,0000002 
(0.0000001)** 
WGDP_SH(t,IN) -0,361 (31.599) -40,735 (18.594)** 1154,983 (905.914) -393,83 (591.858) 92,93 (33.562)*** 1479,187 
(673.249)** 
TF(t,X) 0,0002 (0.007) -0,008 (0.004)* 0,004 (0.004) -0,001 (0.002)  0,734 (0.351)** 
TF(t,IN) 0,0002 (0.001) 0,0004 (0.001) -0,038 (0.03) 0,013 (0.02) 0,002 (0.002) 0,023 (0.01)** 
EI(i,t,X) 0,003 (0.002)* -0,003 (0.001)** -0,002 (0.002) -0,001 (0.001) 0,02 (0.002)*** 0,016 (0.006)*** 
FLI_ND_X_IN (s(i),t) 0,00005 (0.0001) -0,0002 (0.0001)*** -0,0001 (0.0001)* -0,0002 
(0.0001)*** 
0,00005 (0.00002)*** 0,0001 
(0.00002)*** 
FLI_D_X_IN (s(i),t) -0,069 (0.012)*** -0,031 (0.008)*** 0,004 (0.002) 0,0004 (0.002) 0,005 (0.001)*** 0,001 (0.001) 
Log likelihood 6000.0509  5314.6147  2277.5976  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) 1209.26 (0.0000)  834.69 (0.0000)  Not reported  
N. of left-censored (zero) 
obs.  
6,049  5,654  3,045  
N. obs.  12,650 12,650 13,951 13,951 24,764 24,764 
R-sq. (overall)  0.551  0.319  0.631 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 11 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: India, dependent variable is natural 
logarithm of bilateral export flows by industry 
X to India: Brazil to India Russia to India China to India 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Constant -195,275 
(75.907)** 
-155,418 (222.149) 11,825 (12.02) 366,006 
(133.599)*** 
119,751 (28.624)*** -300,839 
(112.386)*** 
LnEX (i,t-1,XtoY (IN)) 0,637 (0.028)*** 0,07 (0.009)*** 0,683 (0.032)*** 0,072 (0.009)*** 0,888 (0.004)*** 0,144 (0.006)*** 
LnGDP(t,X) 3,254 (0.988)*** 1,23 (1.1018) -0,563 (0.487) -1,139 (0.552)** -4,457 (1.067)*** -5,799 (2.778)** 
LnGDP(t,IN)  3,574 (6.728)  -12,554 (4.487)***  13,261 (4.974)*** 
TF(t,X) 1,349 (0.773)* 0,358 (0.435) 0,029 (0.06) 0,043 (0.017)**  1,54 (0.787)** 
TF(t,IN) 0,122 (0.104) 0,002 (0.153) 0,028 (0.031) 0,373 (0.104)*** 0,224 (0.051)*** -0,013 (0.018) 
EI(i,t,X) 0,885 (0.18)*** 0,004 (0.119) 0,206 (0.144) -0,31 (0.086)*** 0,219 (0.022)*** 0,168 (0.093)* 
FLI_ND_X_IN (s(i),t) 0,006 (0.013) -0,001 (0.009) -0,008 (0.005)* -0,02 (0.004)*** -0,001 (0.0002)*** 0,0001 (0.0003) 
FLI_D_X_IN (s(i),t) -7,209 (1.278)*** -5,513 (0.825)*** 0,141 (0.159) 0,154 (0.125) 0,03 (0.009)*** -0,01 (0.013) 
Log likelihood -26294.715  -31158.069  -65668.813  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) 655.98 (0.0000)  602.66 (0.0000)  43250.11 (0.0000)  
N. of left-censored (zero) 6,061  5,698  3,443  
obs.  
N. obs.  12,663 12,663 14,000 14,000 26,677 26,677 
R-sq. (overall)  0.197  0.184  0.579 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 12 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: China, dependent variable is bilateral 
export shares in world export by industry 
X to China: Brazil to China Russia to China India to China 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel 
with FE 
Constant 1,603 (0.606)*** 0,337 (0.357) 1,754 (2.46) 1,056 (1.396) 0,006 (0.077) 0,112 (0.23) 
EX_SH(i,t-1,XtoY(CH)) 0,562 (0.015)*** 0,168 (0.009)*** 0,564 (0.012)*** 0,247 (0.008)*** 0,573 (0.012)*** 0,11 (0.008)*** 
WGDP_SH(t,X) -0,472 (8.512) -11,691 (5.187)** -4,231 (4.597) -0,676 (2.625) 25,573 (10.186)** -1,497 (8.346) 
WGDP_SH(t,CH) -0,000000001 
(0.000000002) 
-0,000000003 
(0.000000002)** 
-0,000000001 
(0.000000001) 
-0,000000001 
(0.000000001) 
-0,0000000002 
(0.000000001) 
0,000000001 
(0.000000001)* 
TF(t,X) -0,008 (0.006) -0,01 (0.003)*** 0,002 (0.001) 0,001 (0.001) -0,002 (0.001) -0,0003 (0.001) 
TF(t,CH) -0,014 (0.011) 0,007 (0.007) -0,027 (0.036) -0,015 (0.02) Omitted -0,001 (0.003) 
EI(i,t,X) 0,004 (0.001)*** 0,0001 (0.001) -0,001 (0.002) 0,0004 (0.001) 0,003 (0.0004)*** -0,0003 (0.0005) 
FLI_ND_X_CH (s(i),t) 0,0002 (0.0002) -0,0004 
(0.0002)** 
0,00004 (0.0001) 0,0002 (0.0002) 0,0001 (0.0003) 0,0003 (0.0004) 
FLI_D_X_CH (s(i),t) 0,005 (0.005) 0,001 (0.006) 0,001 (0.003) 0,003 (0.005) -0,018 (0.005)*** 0,011 (0.01) 
Log likelihood 7838.2057  4878.5537  10071.454  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) Not reported  Not reported  Not reported  
N. of left-censored (zero) 
obs.  
7,351  7,533  5,950  
N. obs.  15,225 15,225 14,701 14,701 18,985 18,985 
R-sq. (overall)  0.533  0.478  0.509 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 13 Export incentives` effects on foreign export via GVCs forward linkages: China, dependent variable is natural 
logarithm of bilateral export flows by industry 
X to China: Brazil to China Russia to China India to China 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Tobit with RE Ordinary panel with 
FE 
Constant 156,717 (96.277) 109,278 (56.553)* -55,342 (181.646) -16,119 (80.477) 131,07 (50.4)*** 107,464 (165.29) 
LnEX (i,t-1,XtoY (CH)) 0,986 (0.012)*** 0,071 (0.009)*** 1,042 (0.014)*** 0,093 (0.009)*** 0,542 (0.023)*** 0,012 (0.007)* 
LnGDP(t,X) 2,764 (1.186)** -0,331 (0.683) -1,644 (0.744)** -1,9 (0.342)***  -7,371 (8.71) 
LnGDP(t,CH) 2,558 (2.275) -1,166 (1.341) -0,024 (0.74) 1,968 (0.35)*** -3,31 (1.256)*** 3,364 (2.922) 
TF(t,X) 0,345 (0.646) -0,74 (0.391)* 0,047 (0.131) 0,057 (0.058) -0,474 (0.201)** 0,147 (0.202) 
TF(t,CH) -4,725 (1.321)*** -0,123 (0.69) 1,33 (3.09) 0,177 (1.354)  -0,033 (0.321) 
EI(i,t,X) 1,089 (0.128)*** 0,035 (0.106) -0,092 (0.159) -0,781 (0.085)*** 0,226 (0.03)*** 0,03 (0.029) 
FLI_ND_X_CH (s(i),t) 0,016 (0.013) 0,067 (0.034)** 0,008 (0.009) -0,079 (0.022)*** -0,035 (0.024) 0,063 (0.06) 
FLI_D_X_CH (s(i),t) -3,165 (0.48)*** 0,048 (0.966) -0,838 (0.272)*** -0,895 (0.563) 
/pv=0.111/ 
1,026 (0.332)*** -0,299 (0.739) 
Log likelihood -33053.322  -31755.913  -49525.872  
Wald chi2 (Prob.) 7535.63 (0.0000)  6013.47 (0.0000)  727.34 (0.0000)  
N. of left-censored (zero) 7,695  8,618  6,861  
obs.  
N. obs.  15,904 15,904 16,226 16,226 20,532 20,532 
R-sq. (overall)  0.201  0.09  0.043 
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses.  
The results are summarized in Tables 14 and 15.  
 
Table 14 Summary of results for off-diagonal backward linkages 
Export incentives implemented in: Export of: Impact 
Brazil Russia Weak positive 
India Very weak negative 
China Weak positive 
Russia Brazil Rather strong positive 
India Very weak positive 
China - 
India Brazil Very weak negative 
Russia Strong negative 
China Very weak positive 
China Brazil - 
Russia Weak negative 
India - 
Note: Positive impacts are denoted by different shades of blue; negative – by different shades of orange. Darker shades correspond to stronger effects.  
 
Table 15 Summary of results for diagonal backward linkages 
Export incentives implemented in: Export of: Impact 
Brazil Russia Very weak negative 
India Rather strong positive 
China Rather strong negative 
Russia Brazil - 
India - 
China Rather strong positive 
India Brazil Strong negative 
Russia - 
China Weak positive 
China Brazil Very weak negative 
Russia Weak negative 
India - 
Note: Positive impacts are denoted by different shades of blue; negative – by different shades of orange. Darker shades correspond to stronger effects.  
 
As we can see strongest positive effects via GVCs backward linkages are coming from Russian export 
incentives for final and processed intermediate goods to Brazilian export to Russia; from Brazilian export 
incentives to Indian export to Brazil and from Russian export incentives to Chinese export to Russia. 
According to our framework, these results indicate that when Russia/Brazil implement export incentives for 
final and processed intermediates, this stimulates export from Brazil and China to Russia/export from India 
to Brazil of inputs, which are intensively used in Russian/Brazilian exportable production of exposed goods. 
Furthermore, these effects are stronger than possible negative “competition for market share” effects.     
Strongest negative effects are coming from Brazilian export incentives to Chinese export to Brazil 
and from Indian export incentives to Russian and Brazilian exports to India.  This indicates that there are 
rather strong negative “competition for market share” effects coming from Brazilian/Indian export incentives 
for processed intermediate and final goods to export of China/Russia and Brazil. At the average, Brazil and 
Russia tend to get more negative effects and China and India – more positive. This indicates that Chinese and 
Indian inputs are more likely to be used in exportable production in other BRICs than Brazilian and Russian.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Whereas much attention has been devoted to the effects of export incentives on domestic export, we argue in 
this paper for the need to investigate effects of domestic export incentives on foreign exports. It is reasonable 
to think that export incentives implemented in a country positively affect its export and negatively – its 
foreign rivals` export. This study argues that in GVCs world effects of domestic export incentives on foreign 
exports can be negative or positive alike. For empirical test of this proposition, we explicitly study the effects 
of export incentives implemented in one of the BRIC countries on exports of the other three BRICs. We 
further weight export incentives by value added ratios, which reflect forward and backward GVCs linkages. 
Empirical results reveal that while BRICs export incentives positively affect domestic exports, their external 
effects for each other’s` export can be both positive and negative. According to our study, positive effects 
emerge due to backward and forward linkages inside GVCs.    
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 BEC structure of intermediate goods` export of the BRICs in 1995-2015 
Figure A1.1. Brazilian export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
Figure A1.2. Russian export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
Figure A1.3. Indian export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD 
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Figure A1.4. Chinese export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
Appendix 2 BEC structure of intermediate goods` export in inter-BRICs trade in 1995-2015 
Figure A2.1 Brazilian export of intermediate goods to Russia: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
Figure A2.2 Brazilian export of intermediate goods to India: BEC structure, million USD 
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Figure A2.3 Brazilian export of intermediate goods to China: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
Figure A2.4 Russian export of intermediate goods to Brazil: BEC structure, million USD 
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Figure A2.5 Russian export of intermediate goods to India: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.6 Russian export of intermediate goods to China: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
Figure A2.7 Indian export of intermediate goods to Brazil: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
Figure A2.8 Indian export of intermediate goods to Russia: BEC structure, million USD 
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Figure A2.9 Indian export of intermediate goods to China: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
Figure A2.10 Chinese export of intermediate goods to Brazil: BEC structure, million USD 
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 Figure A2.11 Chinese export of intermediate goods to Russia: BEC structure, million USD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.12 Chinese export of intermediate goods to India: BEC structure, million USD 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EX_SH(i,t,BR) 40 319 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,9 
EX_SH(i,t,RU) 40 319 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 
EX_SH(i,t,IN) 35 268 0,0 0,1 0,0 1,0 
EX_SH(i,t,CH) 40 319 0,1 0,2 0,0 1,0 
LnEX (i,t,BR) 40 408 11,5 5,6 0,0 24,2 
LnEX (i,t,RU) 40 408 11,4 5,5 0,0 25,9 
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LnEX (i,t,IN) 35 357 13,8 4,3 0,0 24,5 
LnEX (i,t,CH) 40 408 16,3 4,8 0,0 37,0 
WGDP_SH(t,BR) 40 408 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
WGDP_SH(t,RU) 40 408 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
WGDP_SH(t,IN) 40 408 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
WGDP_SH(t,CH) 40 408 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
LnGDP(t,BR) 40 408 28,4 0,2 28,1 28,6 
LnGDP(t,RU) 40 408 28,2 0,2 27,8 28,4 
LnGDP(t,IN) 40 408 28,1 0,1 27,9 28,3 
LnGDP(t,CH) 40 408 29,6 0,3 29,2 29,9 
TF(t,BR) 40 408 69,9 0,7 69,1 72,0 
TF(t,RU) 40 408 71,0 3,7 68,2 77,4 
TF(t,IN) 40 408 61,5 6,2 51,0 67,9 
TF(t,CH) 40 408 71,6 0,6 70,2 72,2 
EI(i,t,BR) 35 357 1,1 0,8 0,0 3,0 
EI(i,t,RU) 35 357 0,2 0,5 0,0 2,3 
EI(i,t,IN) 35 357 2,2 2,3 0,0 14,3 
EI(i,t,CH) 35 357 1,1 1,0 0,0 6,0 
FLI_OFFD_BR_RU  (s(i),t) 32 363 1,3 2,0 0,0 10,1 
FLI_D_BR_RU (s(i),t) 32 363 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 
FLI_OFFD_BR_IN  (s(i),t) 31 864 8,2 5,4 0,5 21,8 
FLI_D_BR_IN (s(i),t) 31 864 0,1 0,3 0,0 1,2 
FLI_OFFD_BR_CH  (s(i),t) 31 864 24,8 8,0 12,4 58,2 
FLI_D_BR_CH (s(i),t) 31 864 0,3 0,3 0,0 1,1 
FLI_OFFD_RU_BR  (s(i),t) 31 864 3,2 2,0 0,5 11,0 
FLI_D_RU_BR (s(i),t) 31 864 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 
FLI_OFFD_RU_IN  (s(i),t) 31 864 11,4 6,5 0,5 26,0 
FLI_D_RU_IN (s(i),t) 31 864 0,2 0,4 0,0 1,7 
FLI_OFFD_RU_CH  (s(i),t) 31 864 52,8 13,2 25,0 92,3 
FLI_D_RU_CH (s(i),t) 31 864 0,8 1,2 0,0 5,0 
FLI_OFFD_IN_BR  (s(i),t) 31 864 2,8 1,4 0,5 22,1 
FLI_D_IN_BR (s(i),t) 31 864 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 
FLI_OFFD_IN_RU  (s(i),t) 32 363 2,7 3,8 0,0 28,6 
FLI_D_IN_RU (s(i),t) 32 363 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,6 
FLI_OFFD_IN_CH  (s(i),t) 31 864 45,1 14,7 19,8 89,6 
FLI_D_IN_CH (s(i),t) 31 864 0,7 0,7 0,0 2,4 
FLI_OFFD_CH_BR  (s(i),t) 31 864 5,1 3,1 0,6 19,8 
FLI_D_CH_BR (s(i),t) 31 864 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,4 
FLI_OFFD_CH_RU  (s(i),t) 32 363 2,3 3,5 0,0 28,6 
FLI_D_CH_RU (s(i),t) 32 363 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,4 
FLI_OFFD_CH_IN  (s(i),t) 31 864 6,7 4,5 0,4 20,9 
FLI_D_CH_IN (s(i),t) 31 864 0,3 0,5 0,0 2,2 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2a Correlation matrix 
  
EX_SH(i,t,BR)  EX_SH(i,t,RU)  EX_SH(i,t,IN)  EX_SH(i,t,CH)  LnEX (i,t,BR)  LnEX (i,t,RU)  LnEX (i,t,IN)  LnEX (i,t,CH)  WGDP_SH(t,BR)  WGDP_SH(t,RU)  
EX_SH(i,t,BR)  1,00                   
EX_SH(i,t,RU)  0,04 1,00                 
EX_SH(i,t,IN)  -0,01 -0,03 1,00               
EX_SH(i,t,CH)  -0,09 -0,09 -0,03 1,00             
LnEX (i,t,BR)  0,27 0,03 -0,08 -0,01 1,00           
LnEX (i,t,RU)  0,05 0,28 -0,11 -0,02 0,52 1,00         
LnEX (i,t,IN)  0,02 -0,03 0,28 0,09 0,49 0,39 1,00       
LnEX (i,t,CH)  -0,02 -0,02 -0,05 0,44 0,47 0,45 0,52 1,00     
WGDP_SH(t,BR)  0,00 -0,02 -0,02 -0,06 0,01 -0,08 0,00 -0,01 1,00   
WGDP_SH(t,RU)  -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,03 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,80 1,00 
WGDP_SH(t,IN)  0,00 0,01 0,02 0,07 -0,01 0,03 0,01 0,02 -0,43 -0,55 
WGDP_SH(t,CH)  0,00 0,02 0,04 0,09 -0,01 0,14 0,03 0,03 -0,56 -0,15 
LnGDP(t,BR)  -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,03 0,01 -0,01 0,02 0,01 0,90 0,92 
LnGDP(t,RU)  -0,01 0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,04 0,03 0,01 0,72 0,97 
LnGDP(t,IN)  0,00 0,01 0,03 0,07 0,00 0,09 0,03 0,04 -0,02 0,18 
LnGDP(t,CH)  0,00 0,02 0,04 0,08 0,00 0,14 0,04 0,04 -0,29 0,15 
TF(t,BR)  0,01 0,00 -0,02 -0,04 0,00 -0,02 -0,03 -0,03 -0,34 -0,35 
TF(t,RU)  0,00 0,02 0,03 0,06 -0,01 0,13 0,02 0,03 -0,47 -0,05 
TF(t,IN)  0,00 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,00 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,30 0,30 
TF(t,CH)  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 -0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,16 0,05 
EI(i,t,BR)  0,08 -0,01 0,00 -0,03 0,23 0,18 0,11 0,09 0,04 0,19 
EI(i,t,RU)  -0,02 0,01 -0,02 0,04 0,12 0,18 0,12 0,15 -0,47 -0,31 
EI(i,t,IN)  -0,07 -0,06 0,13 0,25 0,03 0,06 0,22 0,20 -0,04 0,23 
EI(i,t,CH)  -0,08 -0,10 0,02 0,16 0,11 0,09 0,19 0,25 -0,05 -0,04 
FLI_OFFD_BR_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,01 0,03 0,05 0,05 -0,06 0,07 -0,02 -0,04 -0,74 -0,49 
FLI_D_BR_RU 
(s(i),t)  
-0,01 0,05 0,02 -0,01 0,00 0,04 0,02 -0,02 -0,38 -0,27 
FLI_OFFD_BR_IN  
(s(i),t)  
-0,02 0,00 0,02 0,07 0,02 0,16 0,07 0,08 0,00 0,44 
FLI_D_BR_IN 
(s(i),t)  
-0,03 0,03 0,07 0,02 -0,05 -0,05 0,02 -0,03 0,02 0,16 
FLI_OFFD_BR_CH  
(s(i),t)  
-0,05 -0,01 -0,03 0,09 0,08 0,16 0,12 0,18 -0,18 -0,03 
FLI_D_BR_CH 
(s(i),t)  
-0,09 -0,07 0,07 0,20 -0,03 -0,03 0,12 0,17 -0,06 -0,02 
FLI_OFFD_RU_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,07 -0,01 -0,02 -0,09 -0,06 0,00 -0,13 -0,16 0,10 0,24 
FLI_D_RU_BR 
(s(i),t)  
0,09 0,06 0,01 -0,15 -0,09 -0,03 -0,14 -0,24 0,04 0,11 
FLI_OFFD_RU_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,03 0,18 0,03 0,04 0,00 0,47 
FLI_D_RU_IN 
(s(i),t)  
-0,03 0,03 0,08 0,04 -0,06 -0,05 0,03 -0,03 0,02 0,17 
FLI_OFFD_RU_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,02 0,02 -0,10 -0,09 0,09 0,20 0,01 0,03 -0,32 -0,21 
FLI_D_RU_CH 
(s(i),t)  
-0,07 -0,08 0,16 0,31 -0,09 -0,14 0,10 0,13 -0,06 -0,05 
FLI_OFFD_IN_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,00 0,09 -0,01 -0,03 0,09 0,16 0,08 0,06 0,13 0,28 
FLI_D_IN_BR 
(s(i),t)  
0,02 0,14 0,00 -0,12 0,01 0,06 0,01 -0,09 0,04 0,07 
FLI_OFFD_IN_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,00 0,05 0,03 0,05 0,00 0,12 0,02 0,01 -0,74 -0,48 
FLI_D_IN_RU 
(s(i),t)  
0,00 0,08 -0,01 -0,03 0,04 0,11 0,04 0,01 -0,37 -0,25 
FLI_OFFD_IN_CH  
(s(i),t)  
-0,02 0,04 -0,10 -0,03 0,17 0,25 0,12 0,16 -0,18 -0,06 
FLI_D_IN_CH 
(s(i),t)  
-0,06 0,01 0,06 0,07 -0,04 -0,05 0,08 0,06 -0,04 -0,04 
FLI_OFFD_CH_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,06 0,02 0,03 -0,03 -0,09 -0,03 -0,13 -0,16 0,10 0,26 
FLI_D_CH_BR 
(s(i),t)  
0,05 0,07 0,07 -0,09 -0,12 -0,09 -0,11 -0,21 0,02 0,13 
FLI_OFFD_CH_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,00 0,04 0,04 0,07 -0,01 0,09 0,00 0,01 -0,70 -0,45 
FLI_D_CH_RU 
(s(i),t)  
0,00 0,07 0,00 -0,02 0,02 0,08 0,02 -0,01 -0,45 -0,31 
FLI_OFFD_CH_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,05 0,03 0,16 0,02 0,06 -0,04 0,41 
FLI_D_CH_IN 
(s(i),t)  
-0,03 0,03 0,09 0,05 -0,06 -0,05 0,03 -0,02 0,02 0,18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2b Correlation matrix 
  
WGDP_SH(t,IN)  WGDP_SH(t,CH)  LnGDP(t,BR)  LnGDP(t,RU)  LnGDP(t,IN)  LnGDP(t,CH)  TF(t,BR)  TF(t,RU)  TF(t,IN)  TF(t,CH)  
WGDP_SH(t,IN)  1,00                   
WGDP_SH(t,CH)  0,59 1,00                 
LnGDP(t,BR)  -0,29 -0,15 1,00               
LnGDP(t,RU)  -0,38 0,07 0,93 1,00             
LnGDP(t,IN)  0,67 0,79 0,35 0,40 1,00           
LnGDP(t,CH)  0,47 0,95 0,16 0,36 0,89 1,00         
TF(t,BR)  -0,56 -0,47 -0,60 -0,52 -0,89 -0,63 1,00       
TF(t,RU)  0,27 0,79 -0,12 0,11 0,52 0,76 -0,26 1,00     
TF(t,IN)  0,62 0,45 0,54 0,45 0,87 0,59 -0,96 0,25 1,00   
TF(t,CH)  0,47 0,19 0,24 0,13 0,46 0,24 -0,61 0,38 0,73 1,00 
EI(i,t,BR)  0,22 0,35 0,21 0,27 0,44 0,41 -0,40 0,19 0,39 0,17 
EI(i,t,RU)  0,41 0,52 -0,30 -0,20 0,34 0,43 -0,14 0,45 0,14 0,12 
EI(i,t,IN)  0,02 0,38 0,18 0,32 0,34 0,45 -0,27 0,49 0,23 0,21 
EI(i,t,CH)  0,10 0,09 -0,03 -0,02 0,08 0,08 -0,07 0,05 0,06 0,04 
FLI_OFFD_BR_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,64 0,84 -0,47 -0,31 0,54 0,69 -0,22 0,73 0,22 0,19 
FLI_D_BR_RU (s(i),t)  0,33 0,40 -0,25 -0,18 0,25 0,32 -0,10 0,33 0,10 0,08 
FLI_OFFD_BR_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,04 0,63 0,37 0,59 0,61 0,76 -0,47 0,72 0,44 0,30 
FLI_D_BR_IN (s(i),t)  0,01 0,19 0,14 0,21 0,20 0,24 -0,17 0,21 0,15 0,09 
FLI_OFFD_BR_CH  0,38 0,50 0,02 0,08 0,50 0,50 -0,35 0,31 0,35 0,14 
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_BR_CH (s(i),t)  0,13 0,17 0,00 0,02 0,16 0,16 -0,13 0,10 0,12 0,05 
FLI_OFFD_RU_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,22 0,33 0,27 0,31 0,46 0,41 -0,42 0,17 0,44 0,21 
FLI_D_RU_BR (s(i),t)  0,10 0,15 0,12 0,14 0,21 0,19 -0,19 0,08 0,20 0,10 
FLI_OFFD_RU_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,03 0,65 0,39 0,61 0,63 0,78 -0,48 0,77 0,45 0,34 
FLI_D_RU_IN (s(i),t)  0,01 0,21 0,15 0,22 0,21 0,25 -0,19 0,23 0,16 0,10 
FLI_OFFD_RU_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,59 0,60 -0,12 -0,07 0,57 0,55 -0,40 0,36 0,43 0,23 
FLI_D_RU_CH (s(i),t)  0,14 0,13 -0,02 -0,01 0,14 0,12 -0,13 0,08 0,11 0,07 
FLI_OFFD_IN_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,27 0,38 0,33 0,37 0,54 0,47 -0,51 0,18 0,54 0,27 
FLI_D_IN_BR (s(i),t)  0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,15 0,12 -0,16 0,04 0,16 0,10 
FLI_OFFD_IN_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,64 0,85 -0,46 -0,30 0,55 0,70 -0,23 0,75 0,23 0,20 
FLI_D_IN_RU (s(i),t)  0,33 0,42 -0,24 -0,16 0,27 0,34 -0,11 0,36 0,11 0,10 
FLI_OFFD_IN_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,40 0,46 0,00 0,04 0,47 0,46 -0,34 0,29 0,36 0,17 
FLI_D_IN_CH (s(i),t)  0,13 0,09 -0,01 -0,02 0,11 0,08 -0,12 0,05 0,10 0,08 
FLI_OFFD_CH_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,21 0,35 0,28 0,33 0,48 0,44 -0,44 0,18 0,44 0,19 
FLI_D_CH_BR (s(i),t)  0,15 0,24 0,15 0,19 0,30 0,29 -0,27 0,13 0,26 0,11 
FLI_OFFD_CH_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,60 0,80 -0,43 -0,28 0,51 0,66 -0,21 0,70 0,21 0,19 
FLI_D_CH_RU (s(i),t)  0,39 0,49 -0,29 -0,21 0,31 0,39 -0,12 0,41 0,13 0,10 
FLI_OFFD_CH_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,05 0,64 0,33 0,55 0,60 0,75 -0,45 0,76 0,42 0,32 
FLI_D_CH_IN (s(i),t)  0,01 0,23 0,16 0,24 0,23 0,28 -0,20 0,25 0,17 0,11 
 
Table 3.2c Correlation matrix 
  
EI(i,t,BR)  EI(i,t,RU)  EI(i,t,IN)  EI(i,t,CH)  FLI_OFFD_BR_RU  (s(i),t)  FLI_D_BR_RU (s(i),t)  FLI_OFFD_BR_IN  (s(i),t)  FLI_D_BR_IN (s(i),t)  FLI_OFFD_BR_CH  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_BR_CH 
(s(i),t)  
EI(i,t,BR)  
1,00                   
EI(i,t,RU)  
0,21 1,00                 
EI(i,t,IN)  
0,21 0,22 1,00               
EI(i,t,CH)  
0,17 0,24 0,23 1,00             
FLI_OFFD_BR_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,18 0,38 0,20 0,01 1,00           
FLI_D_BR_RU (s(i),t)  
0,15 0,23 0,05 0,04 0,46 1,00         
FLI_OFFD_BR_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,24 0,28 0,57 0,06 0,33 -0,02 1,00       
FLI_D_BR_IN (s(i),t)  
0,14 -0,06 0,23 0,03 0,16 0,46 -0,04 1,00     
FLI_OFFD_BR_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,20 0,50 0,25 0,25 0,29 0,08 0,43 -0,15 1,00   
FLI_D_BR_CH (s(i),t)  
0,04 0,14 0,37 0,31 0,09 0,16 0,12 0,30 0,57 1,00 
FLI_OFFD_RU_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,37 0,00 0,01 -0,06 0,18 -0,06 0,26 -0,12 0,11 -0,18 
FLI_D_RU_BR (s(i),t)  
0,24 -0,12 -0,06 -0,17 0,13 0,10 0,04 0,06 -0,13 -0,20 
FLI_OFFD_RU_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,30 0,28 0,48 0,04 0,35 0,08 0,94 0,11 0,32 0,00 
FLI_D_RU_IN (s(i),t)  
0,14 -0,07 0,26 0,02 0,17 0,46 -0,01 1,00 -0,15 0,31 
FLI_OFFD_RU_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,31 0,54 -0,08 0,08 0,49 0,20 0,27 -0,23 0,62 -0,15 
FLI_D_RU_CH (s(i),t)  
-0,03 -0,01 0,49 0,18 0,11 -0,02 0,12 0,17 0,14 0,63 
FLI_OFFD_IN_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,32 0,21 0,09 0,03 0,13 0,14 0,34 0,06 0,34 -0,04 
FLI_D_IN_BR (s(i),t)  
0,15 0,00 -0,05 -0,10 0,07 0,43 -0,08 0,46 -0,04 0,03 
FLI_OFFD_IN_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,20 0,51 0,23 0,05 0,91 0,62 0,35 0,22 0,35 0,11 
FLI_D_IN_RU (s(i),t)  
0,10 0,42 0,08 0,01 0,40 0,66 0,14 0,16 0,26 0,04 
FLI_OFFD_IN_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,25 0,55 0,02 0,19 0,25 0,23 0,28 -0,10 0,64 0,01 
FLI_D_IN_CH (s(i),t)  
0,07 0,03 0,17 0,18 0,10 0,51 -0,17 0,74 0,13 0,69 
FLI_OFFD_CH_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,35 -0,12 0,06 -0,14 0,24 0,00 0,23 0,08 -0,03 -0,15 
FLI_D_CH_BR (s(i),t)  
0,26 -0,17 0,03 -0,18 0,23 0,37 -0,05 0,57 -0,24 0,01 
FLI_OFFD_CH_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,19 0,38 0,20 0,03 0,88 0,60 0,29 0,28 0,26 0,11 
FLI_D_CH_RU (s(i),t)  
0,16 0,36 0,06 0,03 0,52 0,93 0,07 0,36 0,18 0,10 
FLI_OFFD_CH_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,26 0,26 0,50 0,04 0,36 0,07 0,89 0,12 0,36 0,11 
FLI_D_CH_IN (s(i),t)  
0,14 -0,06 0,31 0,02 0,18 0,46 0,03 0,98 -0,13 0,34 
 
 
Table 3.2d Correlation matrix 
  FLI_OFFD_RU_BR  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_RU_BR 
(s(i),t)  
FLI_OFFD_RU_IN  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_RU_IN 
(s(i),t)  
FLI_OFFD_RU_CH  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_RU_CH 
(s(i),t)  
FLI_OFFD_IN_BR  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_IN_BR 
(s(i),t)  
FLI_OFFD_IN_RU  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_IN_RU 
(s(i),t)  
FLI_OFFD_RU_BR  
(s(i),t)  
1,00                   
FLI_D_RU_BR (s(i),t)  0,78 1,00                 
FLI_OFFD_RU_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,33 0,11 1,00               
FLI_D_RU_IN (s(i),t)  -0,12 0,07 0,12 1,00             
FLI_OFFD_RU_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,36 0,07 0,34 -0,25 1,00           
FLI_D_RU_CH (s(i),t)  -0,16 -0,11 -0,10 0,21 -0,41 1,00         
FLI_OFFD_IN_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,26 0,14 0,34 0,06 0,48 -0,11 1,00       
FLI_D_IN_BR (s(i),t)  0,01 0,48 0,00 0,48 0,02 -0,08 0,33 1,00     
FLI_OFFD_IN_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,11 0,11 0,37 0,23 0,52 0,07 0,27 0,21 1,00   
FLI_D_IN_RU (s(i),t)  -0,06 0,16 0,16 0,17 0,37 -0,06 0,29 0,50 0,64 1,00 
FLI_OFFD_IN_CH  
(s(i),t)  
0,08 -0,07 0,32 -0,11 0,83 -0,30 0,60 0,23 0,40 0,50 
FLI_D_IN_CH (s(i),t)  -0,26 -0,05 -0,12 0,74 -0,22 0,35 0,02 0,48 0,19 0,24 
FLI_OFFD_CH_BR  
(s(i),t)  
0,86 0,68 0,28 0,09 0,15 -0,01 0,32 0,02 0,16 -0,12 
FLI_D_CH_BR (s(i),t)  0,44 0,64 0,07 0,58 -0,12 0,08 0,07 0,52 0,22 0,13 
FLI_OFFD_CH_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,11 0,06 0,33 0,27 0,43 0,07 0,19 0,11 0,92 0,38 
FLI_D_CH_RU (s(i),t)  -0,05 0,12 0,14 0,36 0,33 -0,06 0,20 0,47 0,72 0,84 
FLI_OFFD_CH_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,33 0,07 0,93 0,13 0,27 -0,02 0,29 -0,08 0,39 0,08 
FLI_D_CH_IN (s(i),t)  -0,12 0,09 0,14 0,99 -0,26 0,27 0,07 0,50 0,25 0,22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2e Correlation matrix 
  
FLI_OFFD_IN_CH  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_IN_CH (s(i),t)  FLI_OFFD_CH_BR  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_CH_BR (s(i),t)  FLI_OFFD_CH_RU  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_CH_RU (s(i),t)  FLI_OFFD_CH_IN  
(s(i),t)  
FLI_D_CH_IN (s(i),t)  
FLI_OFFD_IN_CH  
(s(i),t)  
1,00               
FLI_D_IN_CH (s(i),t)  0,00 1,00             
FLI_OFFD_CH_BR  
(s(i),t)  
-0,12 -0,13 1,00           
FLI_D_CH_BR (s(i),t)  -0,23 0,39 0,62 1,00         
FLI_OFFD_CH_RU  
(s(i),t)  
0,26 0,20 0,25 0,25 1,00       
FLI_D_CH_RU (s(i),t)  0,37 0,41 -0,02 0,30 0,63 1,00     
FLI_OFFD_CH_IN  
(s(i),t)  
0,23 -0,07 0,37 0,11 0,42 0,13 1,00   
FLI_D_CH_IN (s(i),t)  -0,11 0,74 0,08 0,58 0,28 0,37 0,15 1,00 
 
 
